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Introduction 
  
‘Bricka’s heart would skip a beat. Or was it mine? Does it matter?’ (Sundén, 2012: 168). 
  
In this paper, we provide an account of posthuman subjectivity through gameplay. Gameplay has always been 
understood as having an immersive effect on the player (see Cairns et al., 2004 for review). Although the 
empathetic interaction in the avatar-player assemblage has been explored by some (see Tronstad, 2011; 
Belman and Flanagan, 2010; Smethurst, 2015 for examples) we believe a closer analysis of empathy could 
deepen accounts of the subjective effects of gaming, especially when applied through a posthuman lens. Our 
aim in providing such an account is to reveal how the avatar-human relationship is a subjectivity created 
through an intra-active
i
 relationship between subject and screen, where ‘the screen looks back at the viewer 
not only with ideologically specific images, but with its own eye or its own definition of visuality’ (Clough, 
2000: 56).  
              In demonstrating this posthuman empathy, we have taken insight from Sundén’s (2012) research on 
World of Warcraft. In her autoethnographic study, Sundén and her avatar, Bricka, form a romantic 
relationship with another avatar, Slap. Sundén’s (2012) analysis of this human-machine relationship explores 
the interconnections between herself, her avatar, and the avatar of the other player, suggesting that the 
relationship complicates notions of one body and one subjectivity, given the multiplicity of performers that 
took part in the romance. Reflecting on her desire for the other avatar-player, Sundén (2012: 169) asks: ‘[w]as 
it her, regardless of the game? Was it her through the game? Was it her through the orc woman and the ways 
in which she moved and talked and somehow managed to reach out to me and touch something within me 
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through the screen?’. The mediation of digital romantic attachments through the psychical bodies that control 
their movements means that spaces between subjectivities refuse clear separation between player and avatar: 
‘“Hi Jenny and Bricka! I smile. Slap grins. We flex our muscles”’ (Sundén, 2012: 174). 
Sundén’s (2012: 177) own relationship to her avatar-self is described as ‘[p]art identification, part 
desire’. Sundén explains her connection to Bricka as both an inseparable sameness and fascinated difference: 
this incorporation being ‘an intriguing part of game experiences’ (2012: 177). Along with Sundén and others 
(e.g. Filiciak, 2003; Gee, 2008), we also argue for a horizontal, intra-dependent avatar-gamer relationship: 
what is new in our work is the alignment of this with posthuman theory (see for exception to this gap in the 
scholarly literature Boulter (2015) on how gaming enacts and narrates posthuman themes). What is created 
and hosted by the game is a particular example of posthuman subjectivity that blends the embodied 
materiality of the gamer with the informational avatar. 
Where the romantic relationship between avatar-player and another avatar-player might seem 
remarkable, these experiences have become increasingly everyday. In the “networked society” personal lives 
are increasingly co-constructed through technological interaction with a screen (McCarthy, 2001). Recent 
approaches document the very embodied, emotional and connected meanings of technologically enabled 
subjective experiences (Taylor, 2006). In game studies, for example, Filiciak (2003) notes how gameplay 
actions shape subjectivity, and so constitutes an important part of their experience. He suggests these 
connections bring us closer to new sets of interrelated subjectivities that are not bound in the same way by 
traditional territories or industries (e.g. local villages or venues for consumption). Shinkle (2012) too notes 
how interaction between player and screen creates a connection, not only of excitement and awe, but also 
repetition, boredom, and frustration: for example, when the machine crashes or fails to load properly. Not 
necessarily utopian or remarkable, such emotional accounts of digital culture demonstrate the capacity for 
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feelings of belonging (Ferreday, 2009), affective responses (Karatzogianni and Kuntsman, 2012) and 
embodied, visceral ways of interacting with the screen (Hillis, 1999). However, although much research has 
demonstrated the extensions of the body through an online, digital and networked society, few have drawn a 
close conceptual link between gaming and posthuman subjectivity. 
In this article, we contribute to recent empirical research that explores the application of posthuman 
subjectivity to lived experiences. Using empathy as our analytical concept, we apply a posthuman reading to 
fieldnotes produced during gameplay in World of Warcraft. Before doing so, we document our understanding 
of posthuman subjectivity below, showing how this body of thought could develop understandings of the 
relationship between gamer and avatar in gaming culture research. 
  
The posthuman gamer 
Posthuman subjectivity is a heavily contested term. Notions of posthuman subjectivity are not homogeneous, 
nor easy to define, and a vast body of work has explored various “posthuman” accounts as a response to a 
highly mediated twenty-first century and as evidence of a more substantial shift in the meaning of being. Of 
these accounts, many have gained critical attention for proposing a version of disembodied, high-tech, 
transcendental subjectivity. Borrowing heavily on codes from science-fiction, these accounts tend to lead to 
non-human notions of “the posthuman” (see Herbrechter, 2013 for a genealogy of posthumanism and the 
posthuman). Caricatured as either utopian, allowing us to overcome, for example, categories of age, gender, 
class, race (e.g. Plant, 1997; Haraway, 1991), or dystopian, where the cyborg-self becomes inhuman and 
emptied of feeling (e.g. Turkle, 2011), we suggest both exaggerations limit what the notion of ‘posthuman 
subjectivity’ can do. 
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With this caveat in mind, we draw on a notion of “the posthuman” that posits new forms of 
subjectivity have been emerging in technologically mediated societies, which nevertheless only serve to 
highlight already existing forms of subjectivity that are not necessarily high-tech, disembodied, or historically 
recent (Braidotti, 2013; Hayles, 2006; Herbrechter, 2013). Instead, a view of subjectivity emerges that resists 
subjectivity as singular, unchanging and self-contained, rejecting ideas implicit in the concept of the liberal 
human subject (e.g. autonomy, self-determination and individualism). Although not explicitly associated with 
the posthuman, Blackman’s (2012) account of ‘immaterial bodies’, for example, suggests understanding the 
self as constantly permeable. She provides examples of this permeability from early psychology, where 
suggestion, hypnosis and ‘mental touch’ trouble notions of separate, bounded bodies. In another example, 
crowd mentality represents a concept ripe for the interdependence of one body with another, and is clearly 
evident in a range of spaces, such as festivals, dance and clubbing spaces (Blackman, 2012; Thrift, 2008). The 
experience of these spaces is not of an individual, unified body, but is rather felt collectively and affectively.  
From this viewpoint, Haraway (1991: 178) pointedly asks, ‘[w]hy should our bodies end at the skin, 
or include at best other beings encapsulated by skin’, when subjectivity is defined so much by experiences 
that happen beyond the body. This is a not a refusal of the flesh: rather than transcending the body we instead 
extend our embodied awareness (Braidotti, 2013; Hayles, 1999). Contra accounts of posthuman subjectivity 
as anti- or dehumanising, we might instead posit a subjectivity whereby ‘we are no less human than the first 
time an ancestor picked up a stick to extend an arm’ (Tufekci, 2012: 34). Taking into account the further 
studies into affect, embodiment, and permeability, not to mention the different subjectivities that we inhabit, 
the idea of the “rational” and autonomous being becomes outdated, and hence a posthuman model that 
accommodates a more fluid understanding of “being” can be usefully employed. The singular subject is 
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replaced by the view of subjectivity as a flow and a fold, where our materialities are shaped by others in our 
environment, who may be both human and non-human. 
As clear distinctions between self and other begin to collapse, we should also consider what Braidotti 
terms a “posthuman ethics”. She states that the non-unitary subject includes ‘an enlarged sense of inter-
connection between self and others, by removing the obstacle of self-centred individualism’ (Braidotti, 2013: 
49-50). We do not want to propose a gaming exceptionalism, neither do we see it as a particular technological 
effect: however, gaming does provide a strong example where we see a ‘relationship between organism and 
the machine’ (Toffoletti, 2007: 2) that challenges any clear distinction between them and where posthuman 
subjectivity can emerge from the amalgamation of human and informational entities. As Boulter (2015: 2) 
points out, ‘gaming enacts [...] a practical realization that the human is a fluid, dynamic, unstable, 
discontinuous entity. The digital game thus, in its radical critique of the idea of a transparent, unified self, 
becomes a site of interrogation and sustained philosophical analysis’. Gaming therefore might provide us with 
a good ground on which to ask, “what does posthuman subjectivity do?” 
Game research has already recognised the effects of gameplay experiences. The concept of the 
cyborg as a metaphor of human-machine hybridity (Haraway, 1991) has been used extensively by game 
research to understand new subjective experiences enabled by the game. O’Riordan (2001), for example, 
explores her relationship with Lara Croft as one cyborg-subjectivity activated by human agency, and so 
moves us away from dystopian constructs of technological determinism. Drawing on the cyborg, research has 
also shown interconnections between real life and game life (e.g. Taylor, 2006), and technology and culture 
(Crogan and Kennedy, 2009). Research has paid attention to how gaming allows a heightened experience of 
the cyborg-body, through for example rumble packs and gameplay visuals (e.g. where the avatar’s experience 
of blindness or blurred vision is re-presented on screen) (Lahti, 2003). Such research usefully demonstrates 
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the promise of the cyborg as mythical, showing how notions of the transcendental body overlook that we are 
still located in gender, class and race structures (Lahti, 2003). 
The cyborg provides one way of understanding the self through gameplay. But for some, this 
approach positions the avatar as merely a vessel waiting for the player to inhabit, and not a relationship that 
flows both ways. O’Riordan’s (2001) emphasis on human agency, for example, focuses too much on human 
capacity in the gaming relationship. Similarly, Farrow and Iacovides (2012: 5) state that ‘[w]e do not relate to 
bodies in virtual world… in the same way that we relate to our own corporeality… phenomena are 
experienced as representation, not as subjective experience’. Our understanding of gameplay is a counterpoint 
to such perspectives. Banks (2015), for example, has suggested that gaming research has assumed a parasocial 
relationship between player and avatar, where the avatar only exists for the psychological needs of the player. 
By contrast she proposes a social relationship exists, whereby gaming is a fully embodied, emotional and 
shared experience. We side with Banks’ (2015) critique of avatar-gamer research, and attempt to move away 
from a one-directional hierarchical and wholly separate embodiment that moves from gamer to avatar. We do 
not suggest that we live in the body of a machine, but instead consider how a posthuman subjectivity is 
something that arises from a mutual reciprocation from entwined entities previously defined as distinct. 
Gee (2008: 259) suggests that the avatar allows for a ‘projection’ of the player’s own desires and 
intentions. However, Gee (2008) also suggests this is a two-way process, where the player also conforms to 
the desires and intentions of the game. Gaming thus becomes an exchange, allowing for negotiation between 
avatar and player. Tronstad (2011: 254) takes this further, suggesting that ‘the capacities of the character and 
those of the player are experienced as being in perfect balance… The character now becomes an extension of 
the player while still being perceptible as a separate identity with which the player may identify through either 
embodied or imaginative empathy (or both)’. Taylor (2009) too explores gameplay as an assemblage, an 
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interrelationship between various components that flattens out hierarchies between player and avatar and 
where agency exists outside of any particular agent (see also Filiciak, 2003; Shinkle, 2012). A more seamless 
entanglement between avatar and player is proposed here, which opens spaces for thinking of the relationship 
between “human” and “machine”. This, to us, comes closer to the kinds of posthuman subjectivity that we 
suggest is engendered by Sundén’s (2012) research, allowing a romantic relationship that is neither 
completely embodied by avatar nor player. 
Thus, posthuman subjectivity can be easily used to define gameplay, as a fluid, horizontal and 
relational experience between human and machine. But it does not explain what facilitates this subjectivity, 
especially if we understand posthuman subjectivity existing everywhere, as a general state of ‘humanness’ 
(Braidotti, 2013). Nor does the definition of gameplay as posthuman make sense of the very visceral emotions 
that take place, such that one avatar-player assemblage can fall in love during gameplay with another avatar-
player. In this paper, we propose that a posthuman concept of empathy develops such thinking by opening up 
ways of analysing the posthuman condition and permitting a more horizontal relationship between avatar and 
player. We argue that empathy is a useful tool in exploring the connection with the non-physical other that is 
simultaneously imaginative, embodied and cognitive. Our understanding of empathy is intentionally fluid, 
where the binary between the cognitive and corporeal break down and the two intertwine.  
That said, empathy is not an unproblematic concept to bring to posthuman analysis. Therefore we 
outline our concept of posthuman empathy below, before applying it to our data. In our analysis we 
demonstrate the usefulness of this concept through fieldnotes that reflect the embodied, emotional and 
permeable experiences of World of Warcraft. We conclude by suggesting that gaming research could further 
contemporary thinking on posthuman subjectivity by developing accounts of the constantly negotiated and 
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fluid intra-action between avatar and gamer. We believe that such a concept could have wider application in 
game research, and for others interested in the relationship between the subject and the screen. 
  
Methods 
The data presented here is part of a broader 18-month immersion in World of Warcraft, with fieldnotes that 
have been collected during the first author’s gameplay. In the context of the broader project, the aim has not 
been to explore the social aspects of the game (although social interactions, of course, do appear in the 
fieldnotes). Instead the focus has been to explore experiences of gameplay as one instance of posthuman 
subjectivity. 
We have drawn on approaches that emphasise the researcher as both object and subject of study 
(Ellis et al., 2010; Davies, 1999). In taking this approach we recognise the difficulties of using self-reflection 
for research on posthuman subjectivity. If “the subject” is no longer located at the centre of experience, the 
collection of fieldnotes, by contrast, suggests self-knowledge and self-mastery: it would mean the researcher 
could think rationally about themselves enough to write the self. A similar claim could be made about theories 
of affect: is it possible to collect fieldnotes about the pre-discursive and visceral? In addressing these claims, 
we contend that fieldnotes are not in themselves a true reproduction of gameplay experience, nor could they 
be: they are, like this article, constructed. They do however capture the sense of gameplay as ‘a fully 
embodied, sensuous, carnal activity’ (Crick, 2011: 267) that we view as congruous with posthuman 
subjectivity. We also maintain that the fieldnotes are not in themselves a demonstration of self-coherence and 
bounded uniqueness, but are fragments, not least because collecting fieldnotes is messy and open to revision.  
As with traditional ethnographic research, the data analysis has been a process of cycling: applying 
and reapplying theory, and returning to the field to explore instances and themes in more depth (Van Maanen, 
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1988). Our analytic of empathy emerged when we recognised a theme concerning the connection between the 
first author and her avatar, Etyme. In recognising this theme, we then took it back to the field, to think 
through these experiences with our concept of posthuman empathy. Below we briefly explore our 
understanding of posthuman empathy. 
  
Posthuman empathy 
A relatively recent shift in critical theory to notions of “affect” has emphasised the importance of empathy as 
an emotional interaction with another. For Braidotti (2013: 78) empathy has the potential to encompass 
posthuman ideals, through its capacity as a selfless quality and its focus on the emotional rather than the 
“rational” being of humanism. However, we suggest that a posthuman empathy needs to be wary of the 
problematic humanist traits that the term “empathy” might indicate. In the Merriam-Webster dictionary, for 
instance, empathy is defined as ‘the imaginative projection of a subjective state into an object so that the 
object appears to be infused with it’. For us, this definition is insufficient, given that it proposes a one-
directional and hierarchical empathy. In her account, Coplan (2011: 5) suggests that common uses of 
“empathy” have made definitions ambiguous, often co-existing with similar terms and states. With this in 
mind, she aims to provide a clarification in terminology that is, as she terms it, ‘conceptually cleaner’ 
(Coplan, 2011: 6). Informed by psychological and neuroscientific research, Coplan (2011: 5) defines empathy 
as a ‘complex imaginative process in which an observer simulates another person’s situated psychological 
state while maintaining clear self-other differentiation. To say that empathy is ‘complex’ is to say that it is 
simultaneously a cognitive and affective process’. 
Coplan’s (2011) definition of empathy has been, for us, a useful starting point. We were interested in 
understanding gameplay as an example of posthuman subjectivity, and such definitions are suggestive of a 
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notion of empathy that complicates simple mind/body dualisms by refusing the singularity of cognitive or 
affective processes. Equally, we were drawn to Coplan’s (2011) definition of empathy given the centrality of 
imagination, which we recognised in our fieldnotes. And yet in another sense, Coplan (2011) states that 
empathy is a ‘human-to-human’ concept that requires ‘simulating’ the other’s ‘psychological state’ but 
‘maintaining clear self-other differentiation’. This means that the empathic subject would remain distinct, 
maintaining the problematic discrepancies implicit with the concept of the unified, liberal human subject. 
Therefore, this use of the term “empathy” is one that we work both with and against throughout this paper. 
Recognising empathy as an imperfect analytic tool, our definition of a posthuman empathy would 
include: a) recognising the empathetic capacity of others who are non-human, including the empathetic 
capacity of the avatar, which is in keeping with our discussion of posthuman subjectivity and b) 
acknowledging that such empathy only works through the network along a complex range of assemblages in 
multiple relationships with other actors (in this case avatar-gamer assemblages). We are not suggesting that 
the avatar is an empathetic subject with the capacity for imagination in and of itself. This capacity only exists 
intra-actively in relation to other parts of the assemblage, including the player-avatar one. A posthuman 
empathy would mean recognising that there is no primary subject, but that empathy is always already an 
interconnected network of dynamically intra-acting forces, or agencies. This aligns well with traditional 
concepts of empathy, where empathy can occur viscerally between subjects, while sympathy, for example, 
might be understood as more one-directional. It is also important to state that whilst empathy might be 
enhanced, we would disagree with claims that it is only “projected” – this would imply some degree of 
humanistic, conscious “control” over the empathy that is experienced. A posthuman empathy refutes such 
anthropocentric understandings, instead considering empathy as an affective, intra-active encounter. 
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The notion of more than one empathetic subject engenders our first criteria of posthuman empathy. 
Although research has explored our capacity to empathise with biological others (e.g. Rogers, 1975; Hoffman, 
2000; Coplan and Goldie, 2011), our focus here is empathy between the material human-gamer and the 
pixelated technological avatar. This is a very specific other to share an empathetic relationship, and it should 
be noted that the following arguments are based on the avatar as a characterised, humanoid form – i.e. a 
“being” with ‘human characteristics, identities, personality traits and personal history’ (Martin, 2013: 318). 
Therefore, rather than simply viewing the avatar as only a “tool”, we also perceive the avatar as ‘capable of 
inducing empathy’ (Martin 2013: 318). 
As suggested above, our concept of empathy is not complete, fixed or static. Nor would we argue 
that the empathy we explore in this paper is limited to the avatar-gamer relationship. Context necessarily 
shapes the cognitive-affective construct of empathy - which we demonstrate with the example of the remote 
control. The television-remote-human assemblage could be easily understood as an extension of the human 
hand (in the McLuhan sense). However, a more complicated picture is required if we think of empathy as a 
decentred experience. The electrical current, the batteries in the remote, the sensors on the TV, and so on, 
would all need considering alongside the human hand, so that all are acting with empathy towards each other 
for the event (switching on the television) to take place, creating a different cognitive-affective relationship 
than the one in gameplay. This aligns with Bennett’s (2010) analysis of the vibrant life of matter. Where 
different materialities have historically been understood as passive in their engagement with the world, 
Bennett (2010) proposes a vitalism where objects are able “to act”: for example, in the above the electricity 
may blow, preventing that actant from engaging in the empathetic relationship that’s needed for the TV to 
come on. Far from a naive, wholly intentional or conscious agent, objects nevertheless have an effect on the 
world, with both ‘always perform an intricate dance with one another’ (Bennett, 2010: 31). Considered in this 
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light, a posthuman empathy might include, in the case of gameplay, the gameplayer-neurons assemblage, 
where ‘the response of mirror neurons to the game’s audio-visual information activates the player’s motor 
systems, recreating the conditions of the virtual world in the body’ (Martin, 2013: 317-318). Our argument 
isn’t that empathy exists between the avatar and player. Rather, an empathetic relation emerges through the 
avatar-player assemblage. 
In exploring empathy as avatar-player, we take up Sundén’s (2012) position of inseparable sameness 
and fascinated difference, but view this as a horizontal relationship, where both avatar and player coexist. On 
occasion, empathy is experienced as complete incorporation. This is seen in our data when the self/avatar 
become inseparable, with I/Etyme being used interchangeably. But at other times the “I” makes observations 
about Etyme, and vice versa. For example, in an equal and opposite way, Etyme responds when the keys are 
pressed; and yet elsewhere she separates from the player by complaining that there’s “nothing to target”, or 
proclaiming “I’m not ready”. In total incorporation, we might not find these effects. But if we understand 
empathy as a posthuman affect, we can read it as distributed, meaning that empathy is no longer a concept to 
explain “putting ourselves in someone else’s shoes” only to return to the “safety” of our own bodies. Empathy 
instead demonstrates how humans and non-humans are intertwined through their ability to affect and be 
affected by circumstances, environments, and feelings (Bennett, 2010). Likewise, our understanding of the 
avatar as active, agentic, and empathic recognises the vibrancy of non-human agency.  
We use this concept of posthuman empathy below. In the first section of the analysis, we explore 
how a posthuman empathy creates moments of embodied experience, which appear to take place almost-
instinctively. Our second section describes how these empathetic relations are connected to others within the 
gaming environment. Finally, we suggest that this concept of posthuman empathy can be put to use when 
understanding the avatar-gamer relationship, where the interaction between self and machine is more than 
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incorporation of body and subjectivity. Where Sundén’s (2012) work has shown how the player empathises 
with another player through the body of the avatar, we aim to take empathy further, through the empathetic 
relationship that is generated by the avatar-player assemblage. 
  
Empathy as embodied experience 
Empathy can be broadly understood as an affective response to what another is experiencing. In gaming this 
is often an immersive act: the avatar body becomes what we navigate the world through. It is therefore felt not 
only to be an object of perception, but also a means of perception (Martin, 2013) that involves an empathetic 
relationship where our eyes, for example, see through the avatar, but where equally the avatar sees through us 
(Clough, 2000). An instance of this would be how the avatar’s position in gameplay highlights the potentials 
in the gameworld landscape that are interactive (e.g. objects, avatars, NPCs) and “sees” the value and 
prospects that engagement with the interactive elements of the game could provide. Put simply, the player 
cannot act on or progress in the game without the avatar, but neither can the avatar do so without the player. 
The visual field is therefore intra-dependent, opening up the complexity and heterogeneity of the perceptual 
and agential circuits through which posthuman subjectivity is experienced.
ii
 Similarly, when the gaming 
environment or monsters (known as “mobs”) affect the avatar body, our “human” bodies affected along those 
channels of feeling: ‘[a]s any player knows, the rush you get from a good game is not confined to the space of 
the screen; it is a subrational, bodily thing as well’ (Shinkle, 2005: 22).  
In our data, for example, the extract below captures a sense of the interconnectedness of the gamer-
avatar’s embodied experience. Empathy emerges at the most instinctive of “human” acts: holding your breath 
underwater. 
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I’m completing a quest underwater, diving for relics in a deep, wide lake. I’m absorbed in my task, 
deep beneath the water where the colours and sounds are dulled and I am lulled into that ethereal 
state of being. Etyme’s air supply seems ample – until suddenly it doesn’t and I am forced to ascend. 
I begin to worry when I don’t break the surface – I hadn’t realised I was so deep. I need to get Etyme 
to the surface and I find myself holding my own breath, a worried look adorning my face as I watch 
the air supply dwindle and watch her body rise… I make it, and breathe again
iii
. 
  
In this extract, the avatar was experienced through a visceral reaction in the body of the gamer. We could 
make sense of this embodied empathy in two ways. One way we can analyse this form of empathy would be 
through Blackman’s (2012: 82) description of affect as nonconscious mimicry or ‘attunement’, which is ‘not 
about conscious recognition but about forms of bodily affectivity’. When one human smiles at another, the 
“instinct” is to smile back; likewise, in gameplay Etyme’s experience of being underwater is enacted through 
mimicry on the body of the gameplayer. The avatar-gamer relationship creates the space to react in ways that 
are not only imitation, but happen beyond conscious recognition. More than this, the gamer’s experience is 
one of being underwater - I’m absorbed in my task, deep beneath the water  - while re-emerging similarly 
engenders a shared avatar-human reaction - I make it, and breathe again. 
A second way we could explain the complex forms of empathy at play when the avatar-player extend 
into one another is Coplan’s (2011) ‘affective matching’, which she lists as an essential feature of empathy. In 
Coplan’s (2011: 7) definition, ‘this matching must come about in a particular way, namely through other-
oriented perspective-taking’, where perspective-taking is more than nonconscious mimicry, so that emotional 
contagion alone does not constitute empathy. Instead, ‘affective matching occurs only if an observer’s 
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affective states are qualitatively identical to a target’s […] The observer must therefore experience the same 
type of emotion (or affect) as the target’ (Coplan, 2011: 6). She continues: 
  
One of the key differences between emotional contagion and empathy is that contagion is a direct, 
automatic, unmediated process. Empathy is never fully unmediated since it requires perspective-
taking. Roughly, perspective-taking is an imaginative process through which one constructs another 
person’s subjective experience by simulating the experience of being in the other’s situation (Coplan, 
2011: 9) 
  
Gameplay empathy, by its nature, is never unmediated. And although the fieldnotes certainly demonstrate 
instances of emotional contagion, such that there is automatic imitation of one another in the avatar-gamer 
relationship, we argue that the extract above demonstrates more than this. Holding one’s breath is instinctive; 
but in this instance there is also concern and panic. In the empathetic intertwining of embodied, affective and 
cognitive, such fieldnotes demonstrate a reaction to the situation, including recognition of what the 
consequence of the immediate danger is: for instance, drowning. We expand on how this perspective-taking is 
facilitated through the game below. In this extract, empathy emerges directly through the mechanics of the 
game, which produces an embodied reaction in the avatar that directly affects the player. 
  
I am “disorientated” – this is both a spell that hits me and an actual feeling! The disorientation spell 
forces the person hit with it to run off in the wrong direction, changing suddenly at a tangent, and 
then again, and again. It is a brilliant “spell” for the fact that it is subjectively experienced exactly 
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as intended - it is completely disorientating and I’m totally thrown by it, having no idea where I have 
ended up when the spell is over. 
  
As we have discussed above, empathy is more than the impulse to repeat, but is a deeply felt perspective-
taking that produces affective reactions and extends the feeling of self. In the above, this shared perspective 
between Poppy and Etyme is enhanced by a sudden change during gameplay.  
The “disorientation spell” creates a seamless experience between player and avatar, whereby one, the 
avatar, physically reacts to it, and the other, the player, feels it. The account given refutes traditional 
boundaries between player and avatar and the lines between physical reaction and the feeling of disorientation 
intermingle, shaping the holistic experience of the disorientation spell. We could take this analysis even 
further: while we cannot ever know what Etyme feels, this is true of all other human and non-human objects. 
At the very least, the intra-action between avatar and player demonstrates a distributed empathy, whereby the 
body has the capacity to affect and to be affected, so that both have a vibrancy that deems the relationship 
between the two horizontal, non-hierarchical and heterogeneous (Bennett, 2010). 
Reading the concept of empathy through Coplan’s (2011) notion of ‘affective matching’ and 
Blackman’s (2012) nonconscious mimicry, we would argue that the embodiment of gameplay represented by 
the extracts above is a post-biological one: ‘both organic and inorganic, living and non-living, material and 
immaterial’ (Blackman, 2012: 13-14). This takes gameplay beyond the view of the avatar as a tool. 
  
Empathetic connections in pride, skill and achievement 
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I realise I feel really proud of these achievements, like me and Etyme have become a more 
formidable team, working together and eliminating our foes. 
 
The empathetic relationship, however, goes beyond moments of shock or bodily affect, but is also produced 
through a cognitive matching. In the note above, distributed cognition experienced by the gamer becomes 
clear (e.g. “me and Etyme”) and the empathetic direction less so. Is the player experiencing empathy for the 
avatar’s achievement, or vice versa? Just as Boulter (2015: 65) asks, ‘who is playing? Who is being played?’, 
we could ask: who is achieving? Who is being achieved? The sense of achievement is distributed, and the 
source of either achievement or rightful “ownership” of the achievement is unclear, becoming in “human” 
terms an example of “good teamwork”. 
Therefore, in addition to empathy facilitating the experience of an extended body, the narrative of the 
game also elicits emotional responses that engender imaginative empathy, especially in the shared 
experiences of the avatar-human as the two co-develop. Although “imaginative” might suggest these 
empathetic connections are fictional, we would argue that a posthuman empathy would not require a 
distinction between the “real” and the “imagined”. The broad field of posthumanism has already identified the 
problems that occur from creating or enforcing binary positions such as machine/human, real/virtual, 
man/woman to name but a few, and to consider gaming as an experience outside of “real life” ignores it as a 
situated, embodied practice.
iv
 In gaming, the emotional reactions that empathy provokes are experientially 
real, although admittedly with less longevity or consequence than some out-of-game scenarios.  
As with our above analysis of shared embodiment, this imaginative empathy between avatar-player 
can at first occur as affective embodied reactions to events in ways that demonstrate the interconnections 
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between mind, body and cognition. The extract below retells a moment where Poppy and Etyme experienced 
something unexpected, which challenges their concept of skill and provokes a desire for retribution. 
  
I round a corner at one point, climbing a tower, and suddenly encounter a mob which, for one 
reason or another, I wasn't expecting. “Whoa, fuck!” I involuntarily gasp, my heart lurches and I 
quickly scramble to regain equilibrium and kill off the offending mob. It is unlikely that it would 
actually succeed in killing me but there is a particular kind of vengeance I feel towards it for having 
taken me by surprise and I dispatch it quickly - in my mind brutally. It panicked me, disrupting my 
equilibrium and shaking me from my perceived skill and feeling of prowess. I take a moment, and 
vow to be more diligent as I scrutinise the remaining enemies below. I drop down on them from 
above, and unleash my anger in efficient blows. 
  
In the above, we see a similar pattern emerging, where a seamless and nonconscious reaction to the game 
produces a visceral affective response – “Whoa, fuck!”. In addition, however, there is also an imaginative, 
emotional engagement with the game, which cannot be reduced to the body alone. Instead cognitive and 
affective experiences expand embodied awareness through their different operations (Braidotti, 2013; Hayles, 
1999). Here, for example, the avatar-player reaction to this moment of gameplay produces an emotive 
reaction, retold as vengeance, pride and anger. The perception of anger being unleashed in “efficient blows” 
seems to indicate a projected empathy from the part of the avatar, responding to the anger of the player and 
externalising it through action. Part of these emotions are facilitated by the affordances of MMORPGs, which 
enable both player vs. environment and player vs. player gameplay, meaning that the experiences of the game 
are in some way mediated by the existence of other avatar or avatar-player bodies. The further denomination 
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of these “others” as either Alliance or Horde creates a social context through which various power relations 
are shaped (Chen, 2009; Williams et al., 2006). Recognition of the avatar-player self, expressed above as 
being skilled, having “prowess” and an ability to land “efficient blows”, means that, like all forms of 
subjectivity, self-awareness is formed through recognition (and misrecognition) of the self as separate to 
others (both human and non-human), thereby imagining these others to also have self-awareness. 
Emotions during gameplay are therefore not asocial or individual, but are entangled with in-game 
objects. For us, the emotional entanglement of avatar-player has been most evident in fieldnotes collected 
during player vs. player scenarios and battlegrounds. Emerging as events that occur when Alliance and Horde 
factions meet, battlegrounds facilitate empathetic relations to emerge between avatar-player and other avatar-
players, and encourages the feeling that gameplay has a real, meaningful impact on the environment. 
  
I enjoy the sense of achievement which I get in battlegrounds, as it makes your proficiency public. 
It’s basically an opportunity to show off, highlighting how much of a performance it is as it serves as 
an opportunity to display to others how skilful you are, how good you look. You are rewarded by 
conquering your foes and collecting on the achievement points, ultimately winning the battle. At the 
end of each battleground the achievements for each player are displayed, further accentuating this 
public moment of glory - or failure. 
  
*** 
  
There is such a level of pent up excitement on these battlegrounds, and even when you spend much of 
your time dead (as I do) this is made more obvious through the forced procedure of waiting the 
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allotted amount of time before you can resurrect and get back to the fight. At one point I engage in 
one-on-one combat with another hunter: we both circle each other slowly, our awareness of the 
space reduced to that which flows between us and ignoring all of the other players who flow around 
us. Our ranged attack on each other is interrupted by the end of the battleground. 
  
Above, the first author recounts the emotions of pride, excitement, glory and impatience in gameplay, which 
are again coupled with affective embodied reactions such the temporal feeling of time passing when waiting 
to “resurrect”, or in losing spatial awareness and getting lost in the moment. Unlike earlier extracts from the 
fieldnotes, the narrative retelling often appears without “Etyme”, with both avatar and player becoming “I” 
and the events within gameplay affecting this “I”. This has already been noted by Hand (2005: 215) as an 
element of gaming-language that ‘reveals how the multiple dialects – external versus internal, objective 
versus subjective, active versus passive and so on – are complicated in the worlds of performance and 
gaming’. Moreover, the former extract also demonstrates the potential emotional payoffs within social 
interaction. The empathetic connection between avatar-player are so intertwined as to create another form of 
empathy, where the avatar-player joins into the assemblage of other avatar-players. We would suggest that in 
this interaction there is a continuous affective flow, where the avatar-player are not only one posthuman 
subjectivity, but are actively affective and affecting other objects (including other avatar-players) in their 
environment, creating a vast network of posthuman subjectivities.  
  
Human-non-human 
We have argued gameplay empathy creates a range of posthuman subjectivities by shaping cognitive and 
affective extensions of the avatar-player assemblage and emotional perspective-taking with other players. The 
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avatar-player subject is integral: they feel together through the body, while the existence of other feeling 
avatar-players means that this posthuman embodiment is shared, distributed and connected, creating the space 
for emotions such as pride, skill and achievement. We suggest this is both a conscious and nonconscious 
extension in a human-machine world that has co-evolved (Hayles, 2006), and that the two “objects” - avatar 
and human - are inseparable subjects. In our fieldnotes, this is provoked when empathy entwines one subject 
with another through the very human fear of death: 
  
Etyme falls from a great height and I gasp. It is completely involuntary, I am in that moment, her, 
falling, perhaps to her/my death. It is a ridiculous concept because even if Etyme were to die I would 
be fine, and it would take just moments to run my spirit through the graveyard to find her body and 
resurrect. Note the my/her complications. The boundaries are blurred. She is not me but she is not 
not-me. Just as Daboo (2007: 264 and 271) notes as actors create characters who they ‘both are-
and-are-not [...] It is both me-and-not-me at the same time’. 
  
Although the gamer is in no danger, the perceived threat against the avatar is felt empathetically through the 
holding of a breath, a gasp, a “lurch” in the heart. Such instances demonstrate the displacement of boundaries, 
where gamer-avatar are experienced as enmeshed, because they put into practice the fundamental fear of 
impermanence. Such experience allows for a body-subject that operates with and through technical extensions 
and enables a flow of bodily being whereby: 
  
The term ‘body’ is usually replaced by the concept of body-subject […] which displaces a mind-
body dualism but does not reduce bodies to material (physiological, neurological, biological) 
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processes. The incorporations enacted by a body-subject include technical, material extensions which 
articulate the body in new ways. (Blackman, 2012: 9) 
  
We would take Blackman’s (2012) suggestion of the body-subject further, and would argue that empathy 
allows for a state that is neither wholly about distributed embodiments nor distributed emotions, but a concept 
that allows for the dynamic interaction between the two: an ‘ontological inseparability of agentially intra-
acting components’ (Barad, 2007: 33). In Poppy’s own self-reflections on gameplay, this dynamic also means 
that to be both me-and-not-me involves something more than becoming Etyme, demonstrating that posthuman 
subjectivity is not only about living in the body of the machine. Etyme herself is a necessary part of this 
empathetic relationship. At times, Etyme dying can be experienced as the player dying (or provoking the fear 
of death); at other times, gameplay can feel like a negotiation (or even struggle) between two separate-but-
connected subjects. By refusing the boundary between human and non-human and rethinking this relationship 
as one which is in a constant state of becoming, we can conceptualise the avatar differently, capable of an 
affective exchange with the gamer, and creating resonance between avatar and gamer. 
Conclusion 
As suggested, much theoretical work has been carried out with a view to describing subjectivity as 
“posthuman” through the relation of the human to, variously, the animal, the machine or the environment. In 
this paper, we specifically considered one example of posthuman subjectivity engendered by the techno-
informational aspects in the game world. Whilst the incorporation of machinic elements are not always 
necessary to posthuman subjectivity and other domains of experience could also be defined as posthuman, we 
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have nevertheless used this example to illuminate the ways in which an intra-dependence between 
traditionally separate elements can form a non-hierarchical assemblage.  
Our deployment of empathy, we would argue, also moves concepts of posthuman subjectivity 
beyond an account of what the subject is, and allows us to provide a methodological framework from which 
to provide an empirical analysis of posthuman intra-active subjectivity. Our concept of a posthuman empathy 
is decentralized: it is not “owned” by either player or avatar/game but rather emerges out of their relation in 
the process of playing the game. We have explored how the empathetic relationship between avatar-player 
actively makes problematic any clear distinctions between human and machine. We have deployed the use of 
empathy in a more fluid understanding of the experience, expanding the concept to include an 
acknowledgement of the empathetic capacity of the avatar in an assemblage and a rhizomatic understanding 
of the different agencies at play. Our “posthuman empathy” blends the principles of posthumanism (e.g. in a 
post-anthropocentric acknowledgement of the permeability of beings) with the principles of empathy (e.g. a 
dynamic interaction of cognitive and affective responses). 
In this respect, the idea of “the posthuman” does not need to elicit fear of the change in “the human”, 
but rather celebrates the prevalence of the emotional, embodied and permeable throughout different contexts. 
For example, in our analysis, the relationship between Poppy and Etym  is one of care, concern and 
connection, despite the avatar’s pixelated, technological form. Such avatar-human relationships are testament 
to the deep intra-connections between human and machine. Our empathetic relationship with the avatar is 
indicative of the very real experience of being (always already) connected with others, in ways that do not 
fight for dominance of human over machine but accept the equality of both player and avatar: a principle 
central to posthuman ethics (e.g. Braidotti, 2013; Bennett, 2010). What emerges is ‘a more relational ontology 
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that explores how entities emerge from intra-actions consisting of human and non-human agencies’ 
(Blackman, 2012: 174). 
The shifting flows between self and other are complex yet easily apparent in the fieldnotes – for 
example in the switches between “I”, “we” and “Etyme”. The relationship is a continuous negotiation 
between the avatar and player, as the desires of one cannot be achieved without the actions of another, so that 
each part must be receptive to the goals of the other. This empathy is further facilitated by the game 
mechanics which constantly seek to bring the avatar and player together and allow a spectrum of feelings to 
proliferate, demonstrated above through feelings from disorientation to pride. Connecting with the avatar 
demands an emotional and embodied connection in order to succeed at the game, and using empathy we have 
been able to acknowledge these particular moments in order to demonstrate the intra-dependence at the centre 
of avatar-gamer relationships. 
Empathy has therefore been used as one analytic for how posthuman subjectivity has arisen from/out 
of the relationship between the player and avatar in World of Warcraft. We have demonstrated how empathy 
helps to conceptualise the connection between a human and non-human other, in a way that shares 
perspectives and bodies along channels of affective feeling. The experience is one that shows how human and 
machine are undeniably fused, retaining emotional and embodied feelings in a permeable way. As such we 
have shown how “being posthuman” is as complex as being “human” ever as. 
 
Notes 
 
i
 We take inspiration from Barad’s (2007: 33) concept, where ‘in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which 
assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action 
recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action’. 
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ii
 We would like to thank the reviewers of this paper for their helpful comments here. 
iii
 See Wilde, 2015 for more examples of the data. 
iv
 Additionally, in the traditional sciences, empathy itself has been shown to make use of the same neuronal 
pathways, regardless of whether the events are ‘fictional’ or ‘real life’ (Kemp, 2012: xviii), so that the 
biological body empathetically reacts in chemically similar ways to characters in books and films as it would 
to another material body. 
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Empathy at play: Embodying posthuman subjectivities in gaming. 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we address the need for a posthuman account ofin the relationship between the avatar and 
player. We draw on a particular line of thought in posthumanist theory associated closely with the work of 
Karen Barad, Rosi Braidotti and N. Katherine Hayles that suggests a constantly permeable, fluid and extended 
subjectivity, displacingwhich blurs the boundaries between human and othernon-human. In doing so, we 
propose a posthuman concept of empathy in gameplay, and we apply this concept to data from the first 
author’s 18-month ethnographic fieldnotes of gameplay in the MMORPG World of Warcraft. Exploring this 
data through our analytic of posthuman empathy, we demonstrate the entanglementinterdependence of the 
avatar-player, machine-human relationship. We show how empathy allows us to understand this relationship 
as constantly negotiated and in process, producing visceral reactions in the intra-connectedinterconnected 
avatar-player subject, as well as moments of co-produced in-game action that require ‘affective matching’ 
between subjective and embodied experiences. We argue that this account of the avatar-player relationship 
extends research in game culture, by providing a horizontal, non-hierarchical discussion of its most necessary 
interaction. 
  
Keywords 
Posthuman subjectivity, posthuman empathy, World of Warcraft, avatar-player relationships, MMORPG, 
embodiment, digital culture, empathy, posthuman. 
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Introduction 
  
‘Bricka’s heart would skip a beat. Or was it mine? Does it matter?’ (Sundén, 2012: 168). 
  
In this paper, we provide an account of posthuman subjectivity through gameplay. Gameplay has always been 
understood as having ana particular immersive effect on the player (see Cairns et al., 2004 for review). 
Although the empathetic interaction in the avatar-player assemblage has been explored by some (see 
Tronstad, 2011; Belman and Flanagan, 2010; Smethurst, 2015 for examples) we believe a closer analysis of 
empathy could deepen accounts of the subjective effects of gaming, especially when applied through a 
posthuman lens. Our aim in providing such an account is to reveal how the avatar-human relationship is a 
subjectivity created through an intra-active
i
 relationshipinterdependence between subject and screen, where 
‘the screen looks back at the viewer not only with ideologically specific images, but with its own eye or its 
own definition of visuality’ (Clough, 2000: 56).  
              In demonstrating this posthuman empathy, we have taken insight from Sundén’s (2012) research on 
World of Warcraft. In her autoethnographic study, Sundén and her avatar, Bricka, form a romantic 
relationship with another avatar, Slap. Sundén’s (2012) analysis of this human-machine relationship explores 
the interconnections between herself, her avatar, and the avatar of the other player, suggesting that the 
relationship complicates notions of one body and one subjectivity, given the multiplicity of performers, both 
human and nonhuman, that took part in the romance. Reflecting on her desire for the other avatar-player, 
Sundén (2012: 169) asks: ‘[w]as it her, regardless of the game? Was it her through the game? Was it her 
Formatted: Level 1
Formatted: Level 1
Page 32 of 62
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/convergence
Convergence
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 
through the orc woman and the ways in which she moved and talked and somehow managed to reach out to 
me and touch something within me through the screen?’. The mediation of digital romantic attachments 
through the psychical bodies that control their movements means that spaces between subjectivities refuse 
clear separation between player and avatar: ‘“Hi Jenny and Bricka! I smile. Slap grins. We flex our muscles”’ 
(Sundén, 2012: 174). 
Sundén’s (2012: 177) own relationship to her avatar-self is described as ‘[p]art identification, part 
desire’. Sundén (2012: 177) explains her connection to Bricka as both an inseparable sameness and fascinated 
difference: this incorporation being ‘an intriguing part of game experiences’ (2012: 177).. Along with Sundén 
(2012) and others (e.g. Filiciak, 2003; Gee, 2008), we also argue for a horizontal, intra-dependent 
interdependent relationship in avatar-gamer relationshipinteraction: what is new in our work is the alignment 
of this with posthuman theory (see for exception to this gap in the scholarly literature Boulter (, 2015) on how 
gaming enacts and narrates posthuman themes). What is created and hosted by the game is a particular 
example of posthuman subjectivity that blends the embodied materiality of the gamer with the informational 
avatar. 
Where the romantic relationship between avatar-player and another avatar-player might seem 
remarkable, these experiences have become increasingly everyday. In the “networked society” personal lives 
are increasingly co-constructed through technological interaction with a screen (McCarthy, 2001). Recent 
approaches document the very embodied, emotional and connected meanings of technologically enabled 
subjective experiences (Taylor, 2006). In game studies, for example, Filiciak (2003) notes how gameplay 
actions shape subjectivityhave a real effect on the subject, and so constitutes an important part of their 
experience. He suggests these connections bring us closer to new sets of interrelated subjectivities that are not 
bound in the same way by traditional territories or industries (e.g. local villages or venues for consumption). 
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Shinkle (2012) too notes how interaction between player and screen creates a connection, not only of 
excitement and awe, but also repetition, boredom, and frustration: for example, when the machine crashes or 
fails to load properly. Not necessarily utopian or remarkable, such emotional accounts of digital culture 
demonstrate the capacity for feelings of belonging (Ferreday, 2009), affective responses (Karatzogianni and 
Kuntsman, 2012) and embodied, visceral ways of interacting with the screen (Hillis, 1999). However, 
although much research has demonstrated the extensions of the body through an online, digital and networked 
society, few have drawn a close conceptual link between gaming and posthuman subjectivity. 
In this article, we contribute to recent empirical research that explores the application of posthuman 
subjectivity to real lived experiences. Using empathy as our main analytical concept, we apply a posthuman 
reading to fieldnotes produced during gameplay in World of Warcraft. Before doing so, we document our 
understanding of posthuman subjectivity below, showing how this body of thought could develop 
understandings of the relationship between gamer and avatar in gaming culture research. 
  
The posthuman gamer 
Posthuman subjectivity is a heavily contested term. Notions of posthuman subjectivity are not homogeneous, 
nor easy to define, and a vast body of work has explored various “posthuman” accounts as a response to a 
highly mediated twenty-first century and as evidence of a more substantial shift in the meaning of being.. Of 
these accounts, many have gained critical attention for proposing a version of disembodied, high-tech, 
transcendental subjectivity. Borrowing heavily on codes from science-fiction, these accounts tend to lead to 
non-human notions of “the posthuman” (see Herbrechter, 2013 for a genealogy of posthumanism and the 
posthuman). Caricatured as either utopian, allowing us to overcome, for example, categories of age, gender, 
class, race (e.g. Plant, 1997; Haraway, 1991), or dystopian, where the non-human cyborg-self becomes 
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inhuman and emptied of feeling (e.g. Turkle, 2011), we suggest both exaggerations limit what the notion of 
‘posthuman subjectivity’ can do. 
With this caveat in mind, we draw on a notion of “the posthuman” that posits new forms of 
subjectivity have been emerging in technologically mediated societies, which nevertheless only serve to 
highlight already existing forms of subjectivity that are notneither necessarily high-tech, nor disembodied, or 
historically recent (Braidotti, 2013; Hayles, 2006; Herbrechter, 2013). Instead, a view of subjectivity emerges 
that resists subjectivity as is not singular, unchanging andor self-contained, rejectingand so rejects ideas 
implicit in the concept of the liberal human subject (e.g. autonomy, self-determination and individualism). 
Although not explicitly associated with the posthuman, Blackman’s (2012) account of ‘immaterial bodies’, 
for example, suggests understanding the self as constantly permeable. She provides examples of this 
permeability from early psychology, where suggestion, hypnosis and ‘mental touch’ trouble notions of 
separate, bounded bodies. In another example, crowd mentality represents a concept ripe for the 
interdependence of one body with another, and is clearly evident in a range of spaces, such as at festivals, 
dance and clubbing spaces (Blackman, 2012; Thrift, 2008). The experience of these spaces is not of an 
individual, unified body, but is rather feltexperienced collectively and affectively.  
From this viewpoint, Haraway (1991: 178) pointedly asks, ‘[w]hy should our bodies end at the skin, 
or include at best other beings encapsulated by skin’, when subjectivity is defined so much by experiences 
that happen beyond the body. This is a not a refusal of the flesh: rather than transcending the body we instead 
extend our embodied awareness (Braidotti, 2013; Hayles, 1999). Contra accounts of posthuman subjectivity 
as anti- or dehumanising, we might instead posit a subjectivity whereby ‘we are no less human than the first 
time an ancestor picked up a stick to extend an arm’ (Tufekci, 2012: 34). Taking into account the further 
studies into affect, embodiment, and permeability, not to mention the different subjectivities that we inhabit, 
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the idea of the “rational” and autonomous being becomes outdated, and hence a posthuman model that 
accommodates a more fluid understanding of “being” can be usefully employed. The singular subject is 
replaced by the view of subjectivity as a flow and a fold, where our materialities are shaped by others in our 
environment, who may be both human and non-human. 
As the clear distinctions between self and other begin to collapse, we should also consider what 
Braidotti terms a “posthuman ethics”. She states that the non-unitary subject includes ‘an enlarged sense of 
inter-connection between self and others, including the non-human or “earth” others, by removing the 
obstacle of self-centred individualism’ (Braidotti, 2013: 49-50). We do not want to propose a gaming 
exceptionalism, neither do we see it as a particular technological effect: however, gaming does provide a 
strong example where we see a ‘relationship between organism and the machine’ (Toffoletti, 2007: 2) that 
challenges any clear distinction between them and where posthuman subjectivity can emerge from the 
amalgamation of human and informationalnon-human entities. As Boulter (2015: 2) points out, ‘gaming 
enacts [...] a practical realization that the human is a fluid, dynamic, unstable, discontinuous entity. The digital 
game thus, in its radical critique of the idea of a transparent, unified self, becomes a site of interrogation and 
sustained philosophical analysis’. Gaming therefore might provide us with a good ground on which to ask the 
question, “what does posthuman subjectivity do?” 
Game Gaming culture research has already recognised the subjective effects of gam play 
experiences. The concept of the cyborg as a metaphor of human-machine hybridity (Haraway, 1991) has been 
used extensively used by game research to understand new subjective experiences enabled by the game. 
O’Riordan (2001), for example, explores her relationship with Lara Croft as one cyborg-subjectivity activated 
by human agency, and so moves us away from dystopian constructs of technological determinism. Drawing 
on the cyborg, research has also shown interconnections between real life and game life (e.g. Taylor, 2006),) 
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and technology and culture (Crogan and Kennedy, 2009). Research has paid attention to how gamingthe way 
the game allows a heightened experience of the cyborg-body, through for example rumble packs and the 
gameplay visuals (e.g. where the avatar’s experience of blindness or blurred vision is re-presented on screen) 
(Lahti, 2003). Such research usefully demonstrates the promise of the cyborg asis mythical, showing how 
notions of the transcendental body overlook that we are still located in gender, class and race structures 
(Lahti, 2003). 
The cyborg provides one way of understandingis helpful in recognising the temporality of the 
extension of self through gameplay. But for some, this is an approach positionswhereby the avatar asis merely 
a vessel waiting for the player to inhabit, and not a relationship that flows both ways. O’Riordan’s (2001) 
emphasis on human agency, for example, focuses too much on human capacity in the gaming relationship. 
Similarly, Farrow and Iacovides (2012: 5) state that ‘[w]e do not relate to bodies in virtual world… in the 
same way that we relate to our own corporeality… phenomena are experienced as representation, not as 
subjective experience’. Our understanding of gameplay is a counterpoint to such perspectives. Banks (2015), 
for example, has suggested that gaming research has assumed a parasocial relationship between player and 
avatar, where the avatar only exists for the psychological needs of the player. By contrast she proposes a 
social relationship exists, whereby gaming is a fully embodied, emotional and shared experience. We side 
with Banks’ (2015) critique of avatar-gamer research, and attempt to move away from a one-directional 
hierarchical and wholly separate embodiment that moves from gamer to avatar. We do not suggest that we 
live in the body of a machine, but instead consider how a posthuman subjectivity is something that arises from 
a mutual reciprocation from entwined entities previously defined as distinct. 
Gee (2008: 259) suggests that the avatar allows for a ‘projection’ of the player’s own desires and 
intentions. However, Gee (2008) also suggests this is a two-way process, where the player also conforms to 
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the desires and intentions of the game. Gaming thus becomes an exchange, allowing for negotiation between 
avatar and player. Tronstad (2011: 254) takes this further, suggesting that ‘the capacities of the character and 
those of the player are experienced as being in perfect balance… The character now becomes an extension of 
the player while still being perceptible as a separate identity with which the player may identify through either 
embodied or imaginative empathy (or both)’. Taylor (2009) too explores gameplay as an assemblage, an 
interrelationship between various components that flattens out hierarchies between player and avatar and 
where agency exists outside of any particular agent (see also Filiciak, 2003; Shinkle, 2012). A more seamless 
entanglementinteraction between avatar and player is proposed here, which opens spaces for thinking of the 
relationship between “human” and “machine”. This, to us, comes closer to the kinds of posthuman 
subjectivity that we also suggest is engendered by Sundén’s (2012) research, allowingand which allows a 
romantic relationship that is neither completely embodied by avatar nor player. 
Thus, posthuman gameplay could be easily described as ‘posthuman’ (Shinkle, 2012). Posthuman 
subjectivity can be easily used to define gameplay, as a fluid, horizontal and relational experience between 
human and machine., Bbut it does not explain what facilitates this subjectivity, especially if we understand 
posthuman subjectivity existing everywhere, as a general state of ‘humanness’ (Braidotti, 2013). Nor does the 
definition of gameplay as posthuman make sense of the very visceral emotions that take place, such that one 
avatar-player assemblage can fall in love during gameplay with another avatar-player. In this paper, we 
propose that a posthuman concept of empathy developsmight help develop such thinking by opening up ways 
of analysing the posthuman condition and permitting a more horizontal relationship between avatar and 
player. WeIn this paper, we argue that empathy is a useful tool in exploring the connection with the non-
physical other that is simultaneously imaginative, embodied and cognitive. in our connection with the non-
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physical other. Our understanding of empathy is intentionallypurposefully fluid, whereby the binary between 
the cognitive and corporeal break down and the two intertwine.  
That said,But empathy is not an unproblematic concept to bring to posthuman analysis. Therefore we 
outline our concept of posthuman empathy below, before applying it to our data. In our analysis we 
demonstrate the usefulness of this concept through fieldnotes that reflect the embodied, emotional and 
permeable experiences of World of Warcraft. We conclude by suggesting that gaming research could 
furtherdevelop contemporary thinking on posthuman subjectivity by developing accounts of the constantly 
negotiated and fluid intra-actioninteraction between avatar and gamer. We believe that such a concept could 
have wider application in game gaming culture, and in research, and for others interested in the 
relationshipspace between the subject and the screen. 
  
Methods 
The data presented here is part of a broader 18-month immersion in World of Warcraft, with fieldnotes that 
have been collected during the first author’s gameplay. In the context of the broader project, the aim has not 
been to explore the social aspects of the game (although social interactions, of course, do appear in the 
fieldnotes). Instead the focus of the project has been to explore experiences of gameplay as one instance of 
posthuman subjectivity. 
We have drawn on approaches that emphasise the researcher as both object and subject of study 
(Ellis et al., 2010; Davies, 1999). In taking this approach we recognise the difficulties of using self-reflection 
for research on posthuman subjectivity. If “the subject” is no longer located atin the centre of experience, the 
collection of fieldnotes, by contrast, suggests self-knowledge and self-mastery: it would mean that the 
researcher could think rationally about themselves enough to write the self. A similar claim could be made 
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about theories of affect: is it possible to collect fieldnotes about thesomething that is arguably pre-discursive 
and visceral? In addressing these claims, we would contend that fieldnotes discussed here are not in 
themselves a true reproduction of gameplay experience, nor could they be: they are, like this article, 
constructed. They do however capture the sense of gameplay as ‘a fully embodied, sensuous, carnal activity’ 
(Crick, 2011: 267) that we view as congruous with posthuman subjectivity. We would also maintain that the 
fieldnotes are not in themselves a demonstration of self-coherence and bounded uniqueness, but are 
fragments, not least because collectingthe collection of fieldnotes is messy and open to revision.  
As with traditional ethnographic research, the data analysis has been a process of cycling: applying 
and reapplying theory, and returning to the field to explore instances and themes in more depth (Van Maanen, 
1988). Our analytic of empathy emerged when we recognised a theme concerning the connection between the 
first author and her avatar, Etyme. In recognising this theme, we then took it back to the field, to think 
through these experiences with our concept of posthuman empathy. Below we briefly explore our 
understanding of posthuman empathy. 
  
Posthuman empathy 
A relatively recent shift in critical theory to notions of “affect” has emphasised the importance of empathy as 
an emotional interaction with another. For Braidotti (2013: 78) empathy has the potential to encompass 
posthuman ideals, through its capacity as a selfless quality and its focus on the emotional rather than the 
“rational” being of humanism. However, we suggest that a posthuman empathy needs to be wary of the 
problematic humanist traits that the term “empathy” might indicate. In the Merriam-Webster dictionary, In 
her account, for instance, empathy is defined as ‘the imaginative projection of a subjective state into an object 
so that the object appears to be infused with it’. For us, this definition is insufficient, given that it proposes a 
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one-directional and hierarchical empathy. In her accountexample, Coplan (2011: 5) suggests that common 
uses of “empathy” have made definitions ambiguous, often co-existing with similar terms and states. With 
this in mind, she aims to provide a clarification in terminology that is, as she terms it, ‘conceptually cleaner’ 
(Coplan, 2011: 6). Informed by psychological and neuroscientific research, Coplan (2011: 5) defines empathy 
as a ‘complex imaginative process in which an observer simulates another person’s situated psychological 
state while maintaining clear self-other differentiation. To say that empathy is ‘complex’ is to say that it is 
simultaneously a cognitive and affective process’. 
Coplan’s (2011) definition of empathy has been, for us, a useful starting point. We were interested in 
understanding gameplay as an example of posthuman subjectivity, and such definitions are suggestive of a 
notion of empathy that complicates simple mind/body dualisms by refusing the singularity of cognitive or 
affective processes. Equally, we were drawn to Coplan’s (2011) definition of empathy given the centrality of 
imagination, which we recognised in our fieldnotes. And yet in another sense, empathy could be understood 
as fundamentally at odds with posthuman subjectivity. Coplan (2011) states that empathy is a ‘human-to-
human’ concept that requires ‘simulating’ the other’s ‘psychological state’ but ‘maintaining clear self-other 
differentiation’. This means that the empathic subject would remain distinct, maintaining the problematic 
discrepancies implicit with the concept of the unified, liberal human subject. Therefore, this use of the term 
“empathy” is one that we work both with and against throughout this paper. 
Recognising empathy as an imperfect analytic tool, our definition of a posthuman empathy would 
include: a) recognising the empathetic capacity of others who are non-human, including the empathetic 
capacity of the avatar, which is in keeping with our discussion of posthuman subjectivity, and b) 
acknowledging that such empathy only works through the network along a complex range of assemblages in 
multiple relationships with other actors (in this case avatar-gamer assemblages). We are not suggesting that 
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the avatar is an empathetic subject with the capacity for imagination in and of itself. This capacity only exists 
intra-actively in relation to other parts of the assemblage, including the player-avatar one. A posthuman 
empathy would mean recognising that there is no primary subject, but that empathy is always already an 
interconnected network of dynamically intra-actinginteracting forces, or agencies. This aligns well with 
traditional concepts of empathy, where empathy can occur viscerally between subjects, while sympathy, for 
example, might be understood as more one-directional. It is also important to state that whilst empathy might 
be enhanced, we would disagree with claims that it is only “projected” – this would imply some degree of 
humanistic, conscious “control” over the empathy that is experienced. A posthuman empathy refutes such 
anthropocentric understandings, instead considering empathy as an affective, intra-active encounter. 
TheBut the notion of more than one empathetic subject engenders our first criteria of posthuman 
empathy. Although research has exploredfocuses on our capacity to empathise with biological others (e.g. 
Rogers, 1975; Hoffman, 2000; Coplan and Goldie, 2011), our focus here is empathy between the material 
human-gamer and the pixelated technologicalimmaterial avatar. This is a very specific othernon-human to 
share an empathetic relationship, and it should be noted that the following arguments are based on the avatar 
as a characterised, humanoid form – i.e. a “being” with ‘human characteristics, identities, personality traits 
and personal history’ (Martin, 2013: 318). Therefore, rather than simply viewing the avatar as only a “tool”,” 
we also perceive the avatar as ‘capable of inducing empathy’ (Martin 2013: 318). 
As suggested above, our concept of empathy is not complete, fixed or static. Nor would we argue 
that the empathy we explore in this paper is limited to the avatar-gamer relationship. Context necessarily 
shapes the cognitive-affective construct of empathy - which we demonstrate with the example of the remote 
control. The television-remote-human assemblage could be easily understood as an extension of the human 
hand (in the McLuhan sense). However, a more complicated picture is required if we think of empathy as a 
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decentred experience. The electrical current, the batteries in the remote, the sensors on the TV, and so on, 
would all need considering alongside the human hand, so that all are acting with empathy towards each other 
for the event (switching on the television) to take place, creating a different cognitive-affective relationship 
than the one in gameplay. This aligns well with Bennett’s (2010) analysis of the vibrant life of matter. Where 
different materialities have historically been understood as passive in their engagement with the world, 
Bennett (2010) proposes a vitalism where objects are able “to act”: for example, in the above the electricity 
may blow, preventing that actant from engaging in the empathetic relationship that’s needed for the TV to 
come on. Far from a naive, wholly intentional or conscious agent, objects nevertheless have an eaffect on the 
world, with both: the human and non-human ‘always perform an intricate dance with one another’ (Bennett, 
2010: 31). Considered in this light, a posthuman empathy might include, in the case of gameplay, the 
gameplayer-neurons assemblage, where ‘the response of mirror neurons to the game’s audio-visual 
information activates the player’s motor systems, recreating the conditions of the virtual world in the body’ 
(Martin, 2013: 317-318). Our argument isn’t that empathy only exists between the avatar and player. Rather, 
an empathetic relation emerges throughHowever, in this paper, we focus specifically on the empathy within 
and between the avatar-player assemblagerelationships. 
In exploring empathy as avatar-player, we take up Sundén’s (2012) position of inseparable sameness 
and fascinated difference, but we view this as a horizontal and interdependent relationship, where both avatar 
and player coexist. On occasionAt times, empathy is experienced as complete incorporation. This is seenFor 
example, at times in our data when the self/avatar become inseparable, with I/Etyme being used 
interchangeably. But at other times the “I” makes observations about Etyme, and vice versa. For example, in 
an equal and opposite way, Etyme responds when the keys are pressed; and yet elsewhereat other times she 
separates from the player by complaining that there’s “nothing to target”,” or proclaiming “I’m not ready”. In 
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total incorporation, we might not find these effects. But if we understand empathy as a posthuman affect, we 
can read it as distributed, meaning that empathy is no longer a concept to explain “putting ourselves in 
someone else’s shoes” only to return to the “safety” of our own bodies. Empathy instead demonstrates how 
humans and non-humans are intertwinedpermeable through their ability to affect and be affected by 
circumstances, environments, and feelings (Bennett, 2010). Citing Deleuze, Bennett (2010: 21) suggests that 
‘the power of a body to affect other bodies includes a “corresponding and inseparable” capacity to be 
affected’. Likewise, our understanding of the avatar as active, agentic, and empathic recognises the vibrancy 
of non-human agency.  
We use this concept of posthuman empathy below. In the first section of the analysis, we explore 
how a posthuman empathy creates moments of embodied experience, which appear to take place almost-
instinctively. Our second section describes how these empathetic relations are connected to others within the 
gaming environment. Finally, we suggest that this concept of posthuman empathy can be put to use when 
understanding the avatar-gamer relationship as a continuum, where the interaction between self and machine 
is more than incorporation of body and subjectivity. Where Sundén’s (2012) work has shown how the player 
empathises with another player through the body of the avatar, we aim to take empathy further, through the 
empathetic relationship that is generated byshared within the avatar-player assemblage. 
  
Empathy as embodied experience 
Empathy can be broadly understood as an affective response to what another is experiencing. In gaming this 
is often an immersive act: the avatar body becomes what we navigate the world through. It is therefore felt not 
only to be an object of perception, but also a means of perception (Martin, 2013) that involves an empathetic 
relationship where our eyes, for example, see through the avatar, but where equally the avatar sees through us 
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(Clough, 2000). An instanceexample of this would be how the avatar’s position in gameplay highlights the 
potentials in the gameworld landscape that are interactive (e.g. objects, avatars, NPCs) etc.) and “sees” the 
value and prospects that engagement with the interactive elements of the game could provide. Put simply, the 
player cannot act on or progress in the game without the avatar, but neither can the avatar do so without the 
player. The visual field is therefore intra-dependentinterdependent, opening up the complexity and 
heterogeneity of the perceptual and agential circuits through which posthuman subjectivity is experienced.
ii1
. 
Similarly, when the gaming environment or monsters (known as “mobs”) affect theis avatar body, we find our 
“human”own bodies affected along those channels of feeling: ‘[a]s any player knows, the rush you get from a 
good game is not confined to the space of the screen; it is a subrational, bodily thing as well’ (Shinkle, 2005: 
22).  
In our data, forwe find evidence for the interdependence of embodied experience. For example, the 
extract below captures a sense of the interconnectedness of the gamer-avatar’s embodied experience. 
Empathy emerges at the most instinctive of “human” acts: holding your breath underwater. 
  
I’m completing a quest underwater, diving for relics in a deep, wide lake. I’m absorbed in my task, 
deep beneath the water where the colours and sounds are dulled and I am lulled into that ethereal 
state of being. Etyme’s air supply seems ample – until suddenly it doesn’t and I am forced to ascend. 
I begin to worry when I don’t break the surface – I hadn’t realised I was so deep. I need to get Etyme 
to the surface and I find myself holding my own breath, a worried look adorning my face as I watch 
the air supply dwindle and watch her body rise… I make it, and breathe again
iii
. 
  
                                               
1
 We would like to thank the reviewers of this paper for their helpful comments here. 
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I’m completing a quest underwater, diving for relics in a deep, wide lake. I’m absorbed in my task, 
deep beneath the water where the colours and sounds are dulled and I am lulled into that ethereal 
state of being. Etyme’s air supply seems ample – until suddenly it doesn’t and I am forced to ascend. 
I begin to worry when I don’t break the surface – I hadn’t realised I was so deep. I need to get Etyme 
to the surface and I find myself holding my own breath, a worried look adorning my face as I watch 
the air supply dwindle and watch her body rise… I make it, and breathe again
2
. 
  
In this extract, the avatar was experienced through a visceral reaction inthrough the body of the gamer. We 
could make sense of this embodied empathy in two ways. One way we can analyse this form of empathy 
would be through Blackman’s (2012: 82) description of affect as nonconscious mimicry or ‘attunement’, 
which is ‘not about conscious recognition but about forms of bodily affectivity’. When one human smiles at 
another, the “instinct” is to smile back; likewise, in gameplay Etyme’s experience of being underwater is 
enacted through mimicry on the body of the gameplayer. The avatar-gamer relationship creates the space to 
react in ways that are not only imitation, but happen beyond conscious recognition. More than this, the 
gamer’s experience is one of being underwater - I’m absorbed in my task, deep beneath the water  - while re-
emerging similarly engenders a shared avatar-human reaction - I make it, and breathe again. 
A second way we could explain the complex forms of empathy at play when the avatar-player extend 
into one another is Coplan’s (2011) ‘affective matching’, which she lists as an essential feature of empathy. In 
Coplan’s (2011: 7) definition, ‘this matching must come about in a particular way, namely through other-
oriented perspective-taking’, where. In her view, this perspective- taking is more than nonconscious mimicry, 
                                               
2
 See Wilde, 2015 for more examples of the data. 
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so that emotional contagion alone does not constitute empathy. Instead, ‘affective matching occurs only if an 
observer’s affective states are qualitatively identical to a target’s […], though they may vary in degree. The 
observer must therefore experience the same type of emotion (or affect) as the target’ (Coplan, 2011: 6). She 
continues: 
  
One of the key differences between emotional contagion and empathy is that contagion is a direct, 
automatic, unmediated process. Empathy is never fully unmediated since it requires perspective-
taking. Roughly, perspective-taking is an imaginative process through which one constructs another 
person’s subjective experience by simulating the experience of being in the other’s situation (Coplan, 
2011: 9) 
  
Gameplay empathy, by its nature, is never unmediated. And although the fieldnotes certainly demonstrate 
instances of emotional contagion, such that there is automatic imitation of one another in the avatar-gamer 
relationship, we argue that the extract above demonstrates more than this. Holding one’s breath is instinctive; 
but in this instance there is also concern and panic. In the empathetic intertwiningblurring of embodied, 
affective and cognitive, such fieldnotes demonstrate a reaction to the situation, including recognition of what 
the consequence of the immediate danger is: for instance, drowning. We expand on how this perspective-
taking is facilitated through the game below. In this extract, empathy emerges directly through the mechanics 
of the game, which produces an embodied reaction in the avatar that directly affects the player. 
  
I am “disorientated” – this is both a spell that hits me and an actual feeling! The disorientation spell 
forces the person hit with it to run off in the wrong direction, changing suddenly at a tangent, and 
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then again, and again. It is a brilliant “spell” for the fact that it is subjectively experienced exactly 
as intended - it is completely disorientating and I’m totally thrown by it, having no idea where I have 
ended up when the spell is over. 
  
As we have discussed above, empathy is more than the impulse to repeat, but is a deeply felt perspective-
taking that produces affective reactions and extends the feeling of self. In the above, this shared perspective 
between Poppy and Etyme is enhanced by a sudden change during gameplay.  
The “disorientation spell” creates a seamless experience between player and avatar, whereby one, the 
avatar, physically reacts to it, and the other, the player, feels it. The account given refutes traditional 
boundariesany boundary between playerhuman and avatarnon-human and the lines between the physical 
reaction and the feeling of disorientation interminglemerge, shaping the holistic experience of the 
disorientation spell. We could take this analysis even further: while we cannot ever know what Etyme feels, 
this is true of all other human and non-human objects. At the very least, the intra-actioninteraction between 
avatar and player demonstrates a distributed empathy, whereby the body has the capacity to affect and to be 
affected, so that both have a vibrancy that deems the relationship between the two horizontal, non-hierarchical 
and heterogeneous (Bennett, 2010). 
Reading the concept of empathy through Coplan’s (2011) notion of ‘affective matching’ and 
Blackman’s (2012) nonconscious mimicry, we would argue that the embodiment of gameplay represented by 
the extracts above is a post-biological one: ‘both organic and inorganic, living and non-living, material and 
immaterial’ (Blackman, 2012: 13-14). This takes gameplay beyond the view of the avatar as a tool.  
  
Empathetic connections in pride, skill and achievement 
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I realise I feel really proud of these achievements, like me and Etyme have become a more 
formidable team, working together and eliminating our foes. 
 
The empathetic relationship, however, goes beyond moments of shock or bodily affect, but is also produced 
through a cognitive matching. In the note above, distributed cognition experienced by the gamer becomes 
clear (e.g. “me and Etyme”) and the empathetic directionlines less so. Is the player experiencing empathy for 
the avatar’s achievement, or vice versa? Just as Boulter (2015: 65) asks, ‘who is playing? Who is being 
played?’, we could ask:  “who is achieving? Who is being achieved??”. The sense of achievement is 
distributed, and the source of either achievement or rightful “ownership” of the achievement is unclear, 
becoming in “‘human”’ terms an example of “‘good teamwork”’. 
Therefore, in addition to empathy facilitating the experience of an extended body, the narrative of the 
game also elicits emotional responses that engender imaginative empathy, especially in the shared 
experiences of the avatar-human as the two co-develop. Although “imaginative” might suggest these 
empathetic connections are fictional, we would argue that a posthuman empathy would not require a 
distinction between the “real” and the “imagined”. The broad field of posthumanism has already identified the 
problems that occur from creating or enforcing binary positions such as machine/human, real/virtual, 
man/woman to name but a few, and to consider gaming as an experience outside of “real life” ignores it as a 
situated, embodied practice.
iv3
. In gaming, the emotional reactions that empathy provokes are experientially 
real, although admittedly with less longevity or consequence than some out-of-game scenarios.  
                                               
3
 Additionally, in the traditional sciences, empathy itself has been shown to make use of the same neuronal 
pathways, regardless of whether the events are ‘fictional’ or ‘real life’ (Kemp, 2012: xviii), so that the 
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As with our above analysis above of shared embodiment, this imaginative empathy between avatar-
player can at first occur as affective embodied reactions to events in ways that demonstrate the 
interconnections between mind, body and cognition. The extract below retells a moment where Poppy and 
Etyme experienced something unexpected, which challenges their concept of skill and provokes a desire for 
retribution. 
  
I round a corner at one point, climbing a tower, and suddenly encounter a mob which, for one 
reason or another, I wasn't expecting. “Whoa, fuck!” I involuntarily gasp, my heart lurches and I 
quickly scramble to regain equilibrium and kill off the offending mob. It is unlikely that it would 
actually succeed in killing me but there is a particular kind of vengeance I feel towards it for having 
taken me by surprise and I dispatch it quickly - in my mind brutally. It panicked me, disrupting my 
equilibrium and shaking me from my perceived skill and feeling of prowess. I take a moment, and 
vow to be more diligent as I scrutinise the remaining enemies below. I drop down on them from 
above, and unleash my anger in efficient blows. 
  
In the above, we see a similar pattern emerging, where a seamless and nonconscious reaction to the game 
produces a visceral affective response – “Whoa, fuck!”. In addition, however, there is also an imaginative, 
emotional engagement with the game, which cannot be reduced to the body alone. Instead cognitive and 
affective experiences expand our embodied awareness through their different operations (Braidotti, 2013; 
Hayles, 1999). Here, for example, the avatar-player reaction to this moment of gameplay produces an emotive 
                                                                                                                                               
biological body empathetically reacts in chemically similar ways to characters in books and films as it would 
to another material body. 
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reaction, retold here as vengeance, pride and anger. The perception of anger being unleashed in “efficient 
blows” seems to indicate a projected empathy from the part of the avatar, responding to the anger of the 
player and externalising it through action. Part of these emotions are facilitated by the affordances of 
MMORPGs, which enable both player vs. environment and player vs. player gameplay, meaning that the 
experiences of the game are in some way mediated by the existence of other avatar or avatar-player bodies. 
The further denomination of these “others” as either Alliance or Horde creates a social context through which 
various power relations are shaped (Chen, 2009; Williams et al., 2006). Recognition The recognition of the 
avatar-playerhuman self, expressed above as being skilled, having “prowess” and an ability to land “efficient 
blows”, means that, like all forms of subjectivity, self-awareness is formed through recognition (and 
misrecognition) of the self as separate to others (both human and non-human), thereby imagining these others 
to also have self-awareness. 
Emotions during gameplay are therefore not asocial or individual, but are entangledconstituted 
through the interaction with in-game objects in the game. For us, the emotional entanglement of avatar-player 
has been most evident in fieldnotes collected during player vs. player scenarios and battlegrounds. Emerging 
as events that occur when Alliance and Horde factions meet, battlegrounds facilitate empathetic relations to 
emerge between avatar-player and other avatar-players, and encourages the feeling that gameplay has a real, 
meaningful impact on the environment. 
  
I enjoy the sense of achievement which I get in battlegrounds, as it makes your proficiency public. 
It’s basically an opportunity to show off, highlighting how much of a performance it is as it serves as 
an opportunity to display to others how skilful you are, how good you look. You are rewarded by 
conquering your foes and collecting on the achievement points, ultimately winning the battle. At the 
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end of each battleground the achievements for each player are displayed, further accentuating this 
public moment of glory - or failure. 
  
*** 
  
There is such a level of pent up excitement on these battlegrounds, and even when you spend much of 
your time dead (as I do) this is made more obvious through the forced procedure of waiting the 
allotted amount of time before you can resurrect and get back to the fight. At one point I engage in 
one-on-one combat with another hunter: we both circle each other slowly, our awareness of the 
space reduced to that which flows between us and ignoring all of the other players who flow around 
us. Our ranged attack on each other is interrupted by the end of the battleground. 
  
Above, the first author recounts the emotions of pride, excitement, glory and impatience in gameplay, which 
are again coupled with affective embodied reactions such the temporal feeling of time passing when waiting 
to “resurrect”, or in losing spatial awareness and getting lost in the moment. Unlike earlier extracts from the 
fieldnotes, the narrative retelling often appears without “Etyme”, with both avatar and player becoming “I” 
and the events within gameplay affecting this “I”. This has already been noted by Hand (2005: 215) as an 
element of gaming-language that ‘reveals how the multiple dialects – external versus internal, objective 
versus subjective, active versus passive and so on – are complicated in the worlds of performance and 
gaming’. Moreover, the former extract also demonstrates the potential emotional payoffs within social 
interaction. The empathetic connection between avatar-player are so intertwined as to create another form of 
empathy, where the avatar-player joins into the assemblage other perspective of other avatar-players. We 
Page 52 of 62
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/convergence
Convergence
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 
would suggest that in this interaction there is a continuous affective flow, where the avatar-player are not only 
one posthuman subjectivity, but are actively affective and affecting other objects (including other avatar-
players) in their environment, creating a vast network of posthuman subjectivities.  
  
Human-non-human permeability 
WeSo far we have argued gameplay empathy creates a range of posthuman subjectivities by shaping cognitive 
and affective extensions of the avatar-player assemblage and emotional perspective-taking with other players. 
The avatar-player subject is integral: they feel together through the body, while the existence of other feeling 
avatar-players means that this posthuman embodiment is shared, distributed and connected, creating the space 
for emotions such as pride, skill and achievement. We would suggest this is both a conscious and 
nonconscious extension in a human-machine world that has co-evolved (Hayles, 2006), andso that the two 
“objects” - avatar and human - arebecome inseparable subjects. In our fieldnotes, this is provoked when 
empathy entwinesconnects one subject withto another through the very human fear of death: 
  
Etyme falls from a great height and I gasp. It is completely involuntary, I am in that moment, her, 
falling, perhaps to her/my death. It is a ridiculous concept because even if Etyme were to die I would 
be fine, and it would take just moments to run my spirit through the graveyard to find her body and 
resurrect. Note the my/her complications. The boundaries are blurred. She is not me but she is not 
not-me. Just as Daboo (2007: 264 and 271) notes as actors create characters who they ‘both are-
and-are-not [...] It is both me-and-not-me at the same time’. 
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Although the gamer is in no danger, the perceived threat against the avatar is felt empathetically through the 
holding of a breath, a gasp, a “lurch” in the heart. Such instances demonstrate the displacementblurring of 
boundaries that occurs in gaming, where gamer-avatar are experienced as enmeshedpermeable, because they 
put into practice the fundamental fear of impermanence. Such experienceexperiences of permeability allows 
for a body-subject that operates with and through technical extensions and enables a flow of bodily being, 
whereby: 
  
The term ‘body’ is usually replaced by the concept of body-subject […] which displaces a mind-
body dualism but does not reduce bodies to material (physiological, neurological, biological) 
processes. The incorporations enacted by a body-subject include technical, material extensions which 
articulate the body in new ways. (Blackman, 2012: 9) 
  
We would take Blackman’s (2012) suggestion of the body-subject further, and would argue that empathy 
allows for a state that is neither wholly about distributed embodiments nor distributed emotions, but a concept 
that allows for the dynamic interaction between the two: an ‘ontological inseparability of agentially intra-
acting components’ (Barad, 2007: 33). In Poppy’s own self-reflections on gameplay, this dynamic also means 
that to be both me-and-not-me involves something more than becoming Etyme, demonstrating that posthuman 
subjectivity is not only about living in the body of the machine. Etyme herself is a necessary part of this 
empathetic relationship. At times, Etyme dying can be experienced as the player dying (or provoking the fear 
of death); at other times, gameplay can feel like a negotiation (or even struggle) between two separate-but-
connected subjects. By refusing the boundary between human and non-human and rethinking this relationship 
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as one which is in a constant state of becomingconstantly in flux, we can conceptualise the avatar differently, 
capable of an affective exchange with the gamer, and creating resonance between avatar and gamer. 
Conclusion 
As suggested, much theoretical work has been carried out with a viewdone to describingunderstand 
subjectivity as variously “posthuman” through the relation of the human to, variously, the animal, the 
machine or the environment.. In this paper, we specifically considered one example of posthuman subjectivity 
engendered by the non-human, techno-informational aspects in the game world. Whilst the incorporation of 
machinic elements are not always necessary to posthuman subjectivity and other domains of experience could 
also be defined as posthuman, we have nevertheless used this xample to illuminate the ways in which an 
intra-dependenceinterdependence between traditionally separatehuman and non-human elements can form a 
non-hierarchical assemblage.  
Our deployment of empathy, we would argue, also moves concepts of posthuman subjectivity 
beyond an account of what the subject is, and allows us to provide a methodological framework from which 
to provide an empirical analysis of posthuman intra-active subjectivity. Our concept of a posthuman empathy 
is decentralized: it is not “owned” by either player or avatar/game but rather emerges out of their relation in 
the process of playing the game.. We have explored how the empathetic relationship between avatar-player 
actively makes problematicblurs any clear distinctions between human and machine. We have deployed the 
use of empathy in a more fluid understanding of the experience, expanding the concept of empathy to include 
an acknowledgement of the empathetic capacity of the avatarnon-human elements in an assemblage and a 
rhizomatic understanding of the different agencies at play. Our “posthuman empathy” blends the principles of 
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posthumanism (e.g. in a post-anthropocentric acknowledgement of the permeability of beings) with the 
principles of empathy (e.g. a dynamic interaction of cognitive and affective responses). 
In this respect, the idea of “the posthuman” does not need to elicit fear of the change in “the human”, 
but rather celebrates the prevalence of the emotional, embodied and permeable throughout different contexts. 
For example, in our analysis, the relationship between Poppy and Etyme is one of care, concern and 
connection, despite the avatar’s pixelated, technologicalimmaterial form. Such avatar-human relationships are 
testament to the deep intra-connections between human and machine. Our empathetic relationship with the 
avatar is indicative of the very real experience of being (always already) connectedconnecting with non-
human others, in ways that do not fight for dominance of human over machine but accept the equality of both 
player and avatar: a principle central to posthuman ethics (e.g. Braidotti, 2013; Bennett, 2010). What emerges 
is ‘a more relational ontology that explores how entities emerge from intra-actions consisting of human and 
non-human agencies’ (Blackman, 2012: 174). 
The shifting flows between self and other are complex yet easily apparent in the fieldnotes – for 
example in the switches between “I”, “we” and “Etyme”. The relationship is a continuousconstant negotiation 
between the avatar and player, as the desires of one cannot be achieved without the actions of another, so that 
each part must be receptive to the goals of the other. This empathy is further facilitated by the game 
mechanics which constantly seek to bring the avatar and player together and allow a spectrum of feelings to 
proliferate, demonstrated above through feelings from disorientation to pride. Connecting with the avatar 
demands an emotional and embodied connection in order to succeed at the game, and using empathy we have 
been able to acknowledge these particular moments in order to demonstrate the intra-
dependenceinterdependence at the centre of avatar-gamer relationships. 
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Empathy has therefore been used as one analytic for how posthuman subjectivity has arisen from/out 
of the relationship between the player and avatar in World of Warcraft. We have demonstrated how empathy 
helps to conceptualise the connection between a human and non-human other, in a way that shares 
perspectives and bodies along channels of affective feeling. The experience is one that shows howis 
undeniably fuses human and machine are undeniably fused, retaining emotional and embodied feelings in a 
permeable way. As such we have shown how “being posthuman” is as complex as being “human” ever was. 
 
Notes 
                                               
i
 We take inspiration from Barad’s (2007: 33) concept, where ‘in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which 
assumes that there are separate individual agencies that preced  their interaction, the notion of intra-action 
recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action’. 
ii
 We would like to thank the reviewers of this paper for their helpful comments here. 
iii
 See Wilde, 2015 for more examples of the data. 
iv Additionally, in the traditional sciences, empathy itself has been shown to make use of the same neuronal 
pathways, regardless of whether the events are ‘fictional’ or ‘real life’ (Kemp, 2012: xviii), so that the 
biological body empathetically reacts in chemically similar ways to characters in books and films as it would 
to another material body. 
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